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From Concept to Sign, and Back Again
The Soviet reception of psychoanalytic unconscious
In September of 1978, Tbilisi, the capital of the Georgian Soviet Re-
public (GSR), witnessed an unusual event. An international symposium or-
ganized by the Academy of Sciences of the GSR gathered an unusually large 
variety of researchers in psychoanalysis, philosophy, psychology etc. who 
came from Central Europe and North America. However, what renders this 
encounter through the Iron Curtain so noteworthy is not so much its size 
or the importance of personalities involved therein (Louis Althusser, and re-
portedly Jean-Paul Sartre were both intending to participate1), not even the 
considerable feedback it received from the academic world at the time,2 but 
rather its very subject. Researchers were invited to address questions about 
the nature and function of the unconscious, and to discuss the methods ap-
plicable in its research (Bassin, Prangishvili and Sherozia, 1978). 
Ten years before the ban on Freud’s writings was lifted and before they 
became publicly available, the choice of subject was in fact surprising, espe-
cially since psychoanalysis was extirpated both in its clinical and purely theo-
retical aspects from the 1930’s. But then again, by the term “public”, we have 
to imply a number of intellectuals with insatiable curiosity about some lim-
ited samizdat copies put in a relatively free circulation. The oral history of this 
period abounds in stories and recollections of biographical character refer-
ring to that intense moment of discovering previously banned material. Take 
for instance testimonies according to which some of the copies of samizdat 
were handed over from person to person, but, due to a huge demand, could 
not be kept for longer than two days, which incited individuals to round-
the-clock readings; in some cases, leading to a deterioration of the eyesight.3 
Here one can hardly help thinking of the famous allusion: a person is liter-
ally dazzled like someone coming out of Plato’s cave. The myopia emerges as 
a bodily inscription inflicted by the shock produced by the sudden outbreak 
of freedom of reading.
However, by recalling the anecdote I would like to question the very 
spirit it imparts and the simplified view it offers. Indeed, in spite of the ban 
on psychoanalytical practice and of the utter absence of Freud’s theory from 
the Soviet cultural or academic discourse, which in turn was entirely occupied 
by Marxist ideology, the question of its impact on Soviet philosophy and psy-
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chology has to be posed. Otherwise, we risk falling into a hardly defendable 
position of claiming orthodox Marxism to be a doctrine exerting a homoge-
neous power and influence on Soviet intellectual production, which would 
dehistoricize it and turn it into an abstract unity by subtracting it from any 
responsiveness towards concrete political circumstances. The abovementioned 
symposium is proof of the opposite, and in this article, I will try to shed light 
on some of the theoretical, as well as political developments, which prepared 
the ground for this kind of event to be authorized. In fact, psychoanalysis, in 
the Soviet Union, has traveled a rather sinuous path from developing strat-
egies for integration into Marxism, to its utter interdiction, and finally be-
coming the preferred ground for Soviets in establishing contacts with their 
Western colleagues. These developments offer us a spectacle of intellectual 
cunning and craftiness of certain Soviet scholars in the face of challenging 
epistemic constraints, rather than in face of the threatening Soviet political 
establishment. 
Focusing predominantly on the conception of the unconscious I pro-
pose to track several instances of the Soviet reception of psychoanalysis firstly, 
in the late 20’s, just before its ban and, secondly, later in the 60’s and 70’s. De-
spite the fact that in both cases its reception has been effectuated on Marxist 
premises, we will observe some essential differences between the two. This, 
in turn, will help us to put into relief certain changes within general tenden-
cies and specific displacements of discursive limitations in the Soviet human 
sciences from the first to the second of these instances. By articulating trans-
formations of the notion of the unconscious in an ideologically saturated in-
tellectual field, we can attain some peculiar results in what, with a slight De-
leuze-Guattarian inspiration, can be called the ontology of the concept (De-
leuze and Guattari, 2005). But this rather theoretical insight can also give us 
a better understanding of the criteria the Soviet censorship was based on, and 
in addition can provide us with a perspective on the endeavors of the Soviet 
commentators. 
Before discussing the circumstances, which made it possible to reinte-
grate Freud back into the debates in philosophy and psychology, we need to 
first reconstitute the arguments which were called into play in order to con-
demn Freud’s theoretical work and brand psychoanalysis as an illegitimate 
theoretical framework.  In the1910’s and 20’s psychoanalysis was very active-
ly taken up in Russia before being brusquely and rather smoothly stricken 
from intellectual life. There are diverging versions of the exact circumstances 
of the ban of psychoanalysis in the early 30’s, though what is surely known 
is that the ban was embedded into a larger struggle against the “Trotskyist 
bourgeois contraband” (Stalin, 1931) and was aimed at reinforcing Stalinism. 
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In the aftermath of the interdiction, the researchers, who were previously en-
gaged mainly in psychoanalysis, shifted their interests towards new branch-
es of Soviet science like pedology or psychotechnics. Pedology was provid-
ed with huge institutional support and was implanted into Soviet schools 
through 1937, which is when it was definitively banned and deprived of its 
institutional structure.4
Looking back at psychoanalysis just before its interdiction we can state 
that in the 20’s it enjoyed great popularity: the totality of Freud’s texts were 
already translated into Russian, the State Psychoanalytical Institute (ГПАИ) 
was functioning, a number of psychoanalytical circles and associations existed 
in different Russian cities and a psychoanalytical book series were issued, with 
the chief editor I. D. Yermakov (Оvcharenko, 2000). One of the burning is-
sues of the time was to bring psychoanalysis, or Freudism, as it was referred 
to at the time, to terms with Marxism. Early Soviet interpreters differed in 
attributing to Freudism different degrees of propensity towards Marxism. The 
Freudo-Marxist debates of the 20’s are well documented and investigated. It 
should suffice to highlight the main critical points and suggestions proposed 
by V. N. Voloshinov in his extended study titled Freudism. Critical essay (Vo-
loshinov, 1927). In fact, the text, besides being acknowledged as one of the 
most synthetic, many-sided and in-depth accounts critically covering both 
Freud’s theory and its Soviet appropriations (Etkind, 1993), contains claims, 
which remain relevant for later developments as well, and can be instrumen-
tal in demonstrating the transformations of the notion of the unconscious.5
Voloshinov’s main objective was to dismantle Freudism both on its on-
tological and methodological levels and disclose its ideological core. He pre-
sented Freudism as being rooted in the “decadent European culture”, which 
prompted it to assume and reflect certain elements of the sociological plane 
even on its methodological level. Qualifying these elements as constituent 
to the very theoretical framework of Freudism, Voloshinov puts forward the 
idea of the essential incompatibility of Freudismwith Marxism. I would say, 
that Voloshinov aims at showing the impossibility of applying psychoanaly-
sis (be it in a descriptive or in a clinical sense) to the type of subject, which 
populated the transforming society he belonged to, a society, which was to 
be devoid of class division.
As Voloshinov saw it, Freud uncritically took over the traditional cat-
egories of subjective psychology such as, will, sensations, psychic content, etc., 
and spread them to the unconscious. As these categories or elements are to be 
accessed only through self-observation, which, in turn, is a procedure related 
exclusively to the conscious, Voloshinov spots a methodological problem of 
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psychoanalysis. Freud baselessly transposes these conscious-related elements 
onto a newly discovered psychic dimension defined as the unconscious.
Further, Voloshinov points out that since Freud filled the conscious and 
the unconscious with qualitatively similar content, the only method we can 
rely on in drawing the cryptic content out is still the procedure of self-ob-
servation. Voloshinov claims that the necessary condition of Freud’s method, 
according to which the only way for the repressed content to become know-
able lays through consciousness, makes it impossible to establish a positive 
ontological definition of the unconscious. Due to its method, psychoanalysis 
is locked in the subjective paradigm and loses access to objectivity. The denial 
of objectivity is twofold: on the one hand, given the fact that an immediate 
access to the unconscious is impossible, it can be claimed, that psychoanalysis 
simply adds some further complexity to the already existing “subjectivist” psy-
chological scheme, in which the psychic entirely coincides with the conscious. 
On the other hand, psychoanalysis fails in grasping the objective materiality 
and is doomed to ignore it unless it transforms it in to conscious material. As 
we can see, Voloshinov, in his use of these two arguments targets respectively 
the subjectivist and the idealistic characteristics of the Freudian conception of 
the unconscious. He goes on arguing that even in the case of psychosomatic 
phenomena, the crucial question psychoanalysis raises is not that of material 
or physiologic components, but the one concerning their psychic counterpart, 
capable of self-observation. He advances a similar type of critical argument 
against a biological interpretation of psychoanalysis, according to which, the 
theory of drive is rooted in biological reality, the latter being the guarantee of 
the objective basis for the whole theory. Voloshinov is inclined to see things 
in a different perspective, affirming, that it is Freudism itself, which is respon-
sible for psychologizing and subjectivizing biology. Given the predominant 
subjectivist character of psychoanalysis, any biological notion it may resort to 
as a descriptive term for organic processes, necessarily loses its consistency, 
ending up in some kind of psycho-subjectivism.  
Clearly, the psychology Voloshinov is pleading for is one, based on an 
objective method. Nonetheless, one could be misled in thinking that what he 
is implying here comes close to Pavlovian reflexology or Deweyan behavior-
ism. Quite obviously, he seeks to defend and keep to monistic materialism, 
which is imposed by orthodox Marxism and is a methodological imperative 
in the sciences.  To do so, he needs to take issue with the Freudian psycho-
physiological parallelism. However, we need to ask what exactly is meant by 
materialism and the objective method. Voloshinov would not argue that the 
psychic is nothing else than an attribute of an organized materiality.
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To clarify his stance we can examine a further critical attack Voloshinov 
directs against psychoanalysis after having demonstrated its persistent sub-
jectivist character conditioned by its very methodology. This time he aims at 
disclosing its ideological essence. To this end, he focuses on the antagonistic 
relationship between the conscious and the unconscious as presented in psy-
choanalysis and examines this relationship in two steps. First, he reiterates 
the abovementioned point as to the qualitative homogeneity of the elements 
making up both the conscious and the unconscious content, the latter be-
ing nothing essentially different from the former except its repressed version. 
Second, and here we come to the crucial point, Voloshinov establishes, that 
the passage of content from its unconscious to its conscious state consists in 
the gesture of verbalization. As he puts it, verbalization is the cathartic mo-
ment of psychoanalysis. His account of the main premises of Freudism en-
ables Voloshinov to present the antagonism between the conscious and the 
unconscious asa conflict between verbal and non-verbal reactions. In fact, for 
Voloshinov the difference between conscious and unconscious content lays 
in their different capacity to be incarnated into discursive chains. This capac-
ity, for its part, varies according to the motives implied in those contents. So, 
for instance, content related to sexual motives are less prone to verbalization. 
Voloshinov puts a special emphasis on the constituent role that speech plays 
in the psychoanalytical practice and brings forth the sociolinguistic6 dimen-
sion of language. With this blind spot of Freudism uncovered, Voloshinov 
pursues a different criticism exposing psychoanalysis in its lack of sensibility 
towards the ideological reality in habiting language.
Instead of making the “psychic forces” accountable for the conscious/
unconscious antagonism, Voloshinov relocates the source of the conflict into 
the variable capacity and readiness of different motives to be incarnated into 
linguistic expression. However, to be precise, “speech” for Voloshinov is not 
something that is simply uttered. We are dealing here with a notion, in which 
the internal (thought) and external (uttered) speeches overlap with each oth-
er. These two levels coincide with each other, but are still separate enough to 
maintain a distinction between them. This leads to the assumption that the 
incapacity to utter stands for the incapacity to think, which allows Voloshi-
nov to qualify the unconscious motives, as described in the psychoanalytic 
practice, as those motives, which are inhibited by ideologically saturated lan-
guage from taking the form of utterances, that is to say, from being brought 
to consciousness and rendered thinkable. The resistance of different content 
to manifesting in speech is not absolute, but gradual and the threshold in 
each case is defined by ideology. I would note that once speech, by virtue of 
its sociolinguistic dimension, extends beyond the individual level and enters 
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the realm of group relationships, the Freudian conflict between conscious and 
unconscious undergoes a requalification by Voloshinov: at this stage conflict 
is seen as a mere projection of certain objective (and foremost social) relations 
onto the psychic. This is how, through a peculiar conception of language, and 
foremost, through his notion of speech, Voloshinov repositions psychoanaly-
sis on the bases of ontological monism. The inclusion of materialist elements, 
that is to say, of the social and the ideological dimensions into psychoanalysis 
enables him to reveal the conscious/unconscious difference as one, which far 
from being an inherent and an a historical characteristic of the psychic, is a 
provisional phenomenon produced by the contradictions intrinsic to the het-
erogeneous ideology of a society with class divisions. The divided psychoana-
lytic subject does not endanger the ontological monism, but on the contrary, 
can be explained through the latter as a local and historically situated aberra-
tion, conditioned by particular ideological and social surroundings. 
All of the above can be summarized as follows: according to Voloshinov, 
the guarantor for a theory to be materialist and “scientific” is the openness 
of its object towards social and historical contextualization. The ontological 
monism does not consist in some sort of synthesis between body and mind, 
or between the psychic and physiologic, but in an uninterrupted, continual 
psycho-social vision of things. Finally, the kind of Freudism, which lacks ac-
cess to the historical, contributes in reinforcing the existing social institutions 
(family, church etc.) by rooting them deep into the individual psyche, which is 
presented as an immutable unity, closed upon oneself. However, Voloshinov’s 
interpretation of the conscious/unconscious antagonism as conditioned by 
the social and ideological contradictions raises a question: should it be con-
cluded, that the subject in a society without class divisions does not include a 
motivational contradiction? Assumptions about Voloshinov’s stance towards 
this problem would amount to speculation, however his interpretation, such 
as it is, helps us in understanding what was meant later, in the 1960’s by as-
sertions concerning the inapplicability of psychoanalysis to the Soviet man 
and the unnecessary character of psychoanalysis in Soviet society.
Indeed, a few years after the publication of Voloshinov’s text, psycho-
analysis was banned in the Soviet Union7and academic debates were not the 
cause for its defeat. Virtually any attempt to trace the lines of different con-
ceptual frameworks during this period of Soviet history necessarily comes up 
against the facts of drastic caesurae, externally caused radical interruptions 
and artificial suspensions designed for concrete political purposes, inflicted 
with authoritarian means. Curiously enough, when dealing with the history 
of psychoanalysis, Voloshinov’s text itself gives us an interesting insight into 
the real reasons of its halt. In the last chapter of Freudism, when Voloshinov 
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begins to expose and criticize interpretations of a number of Russian Freud-
ist-Marxists, he mentions Trotsky as well, and specifically his book Literature 
and Revolution (Trotsky, 1923). However, Voloshinov disdainfully refuses to 
subject this text to any serious critical examination citing the extremely poor 
arguments elaborated therein. This shows, that Trotsky was far from being re-
garded as a respectable interpreter on par with his fellow commentators, who 
were rather neglectful towards him, and proves once again, that the ban on 
Freudism was nothing but an expression of a political combat and its trans-
position onto scientific ground, first of all resulting from Trotsky’s political 
activity itself. As Stalinism started gaining ground, the ban turned to be in-
evitable given the larger context of the ongoing purification of science from 
the “Trotskyist bourgeois contraband,” as was already mentioned. An unso-
phisticated and badly timed political use of psychoanalysis, prevented Freud 
from entering the Soviet pantheon of bourgeois thinkers, who, as fallen an-
gels, had flirted with all kinds of non-materialist ideas, but ultimately, could 
be ennobled and presented as positive contributors to the historical even-
tuality of dialectical materialism. Even though the Marxist-oriented 1920’s 
Soviet elaborations of Freudism could surely have served as the basis for just 
such an eventuality. 
After the disappearance of psychoanalysis from all domains of Soviet 
life it first reappeared in 1958, when a scientific council was summoned in the 
Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR in order to address questions of 
ideological struggle against contemporary Freudism (Bondarenko and Rabi-
novich, 1959). Results and conclusions of this meeting are of great interest, 
because they set the guidelines for the treatment of Freudism and shaped 
subsequent theoretical elaborations in this direction. As one could expect, all 
of the various developments of the 1920’s were left aside without a mention, 
whereas the absence of psychoanalysis in the Soviet Union was presented as 
a natural state of affairs resulting from the noncompetitive character of psy-
choanalysis in the face of materialist and physiological approaches of Sovi-
et scientists. However, what is important here are the reasons for this need 
to refocus the attention on psychoanalysis, as well as the recommendations, 
which followed. The council observed that psychoanalysis was losing its posi-
tion in the capitalist world, which incited the Soviets to play an active role in 
its worldwide defeat. At the same time, they were obliged to admit that argu-
ments, with which they tried to face their colleagues from the capitalist world, 
were considered by them to be obsolete, useless or sheer products of incom-
prehension. This led the council-members to set recommendations, which in 
a way, repeated the famous slogan of Khrushchev: “catch up and surpass”. This 
recommendation appears quite contradictory if we consider the fact that the 
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advancement of the knowledge of Freudism, coupled with the obligation to 
disavow it, had to be stimulated in the context of heavy censorship and the 
ban on psychoanalysis as well as on all of Freuds’ oeuvre.
Filipp Veniaminovich Bassin, a psychologist, present at the abovemen-
tioned meeting, found a formidable solution to this contradictory demand 
of simultaneous convergence and divergence. By distorting the psychoana-
lytical concept of the unconscious, paradoxically enough, he prepared the 
ground for it to be adequately grasped in a long run. Already in the report 
from the council meeting, as well as in his article dated from the same year 
(Bassin, 1958) Bassin claimed, that Freud, before taking on the idealistic and 
subjectivist perspective, tried to find support in the neuro-physiological data. 
A decade later, Bassin issue da book titled The Problem of the unconscious: On 
the unconscious forms of the highest nervous activity (Bassin, 1968),which com-
bines Freudian and neuro-scientific overtones and introduces a peculiar ver-
sion of the concept of the unconscious. It is, indeed, a curious fact, that the 
rehabilitation of this notion in the Soviet academic discourse of the1960s 
takes place in a way, which is diametrically opposed to Voloshinov’s respec-
tive stance on the issue. For instance, the latter, considered that synthetiz-
ing reflexology with psychoanalysis had nothing to do either with Marxism, 
or with science. According to claims of those, who, contrary to Voloshinov, 
shared this approach back in the 1920’s, this kind of synthesis was capable 
for producing a new version of Freudism, purified of all the metaphysical el-
ements and providing it with objective, biological foundations. Moreover, 
this was considered to be a convenient means of putting psychoanalysis in 
conformity with ontological monism. Voloshinov, on his part, insisted, that 
translating a theory into the terms of another theory is a vain and worthless 
task. In doing so, one loses its object (which is nothing but what is consti-
tuted by means of the method itself ) and there is nothing that the result of 
such a synthesis can apply to. In fact, in this case, the two objects of synthesis 
mutually destroy each other. 
In spite of the obvious difficulties, Bassin, in his book, nevertheless 
aims at shedding light on the phenomenon of the unconscious by converging 
the “new achievements in neurocybernetics” and the “new approaches in the 
physiological theory of brain function”. He strangely insists on the notion of 
the unconscious by joining it to the theoretical positions of a number of phi-
losophers and scientists (ranging from Wundt to Pavlov, from Brentano to 
Freud etc.) and tries to demonstrate the existence of this concept, or, at least, 
that of its prefiguration, in their respective work. Not surprisingly, the abusive 
usage of the notion ends up eroding its very core, even if Freud remains the 
landmark figure throughout the book and the reader is consistently remind-
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ed of the psychoanalytical notion of the unconscious. We can clearly sense 
here the author’s attempt to ennoble this disfavored concept. But the reasons 
he is driven by seem enigmatic, given the fact that his goal of reinstating the 
psychoanalytical concept of the unconscious, in the Soviet context, cannot be 
achieved without destroying the very identity of this concept.
Before trying to elucidate the enigma, the differences between the in-
tellectual environment in which Voloshinov and Bassin worked must be con-
sidered. Voloshinov approaches Freudism as a theory one should first pen-
etrate and understand, and then transform it from the inside. Bassin, on the 
contrary, staying outside the theory, goes after it with ready-made postulates 
and conceptual notions wholly accepted and legitimized within his contem-
porary academic discourse. Moreover, Voloshinov stresses the importance of 
the historical and the social conditions and considers them as the aspects, 
which secure and uphold the methodological objectivity and the ontological 
monism alike. Bassin keeps both of these imperatives, but, contrary to Vo-
loshinov, situates their source in the domain of physiology and, more gener-
ally, in that of science. Lastly, Bassin does not consider Freudism as a source 
of a conceptuality, which has to be subjected to a productive appropriation 
and elaboration, but rather as a negatively marked unity, which one should 
integrate and render acceptable at all costs and still keep the appearance of 
opposition and rivalry. 
In explaining Bassin’s strange approach in which his method goes 
against his very objective, it would be instructive to evoke the memoirs of 
his colleague and one of the co-organizers of the Tbilisi symposium, Vadim 
Rotenberg. Rotenberg thinks that not only is Bassin’s book pure and simple 
mystification, in which the author utterly falsifies the conception of the un-
conscious, trying to present the activity of neurons and diverse physiological 
elements of the body as an activity of the unconscious, but also he claims, 
that Bassin did it deliberately (Rotenberg 2014). He did it purposely, know-
ing, that by mobilizing a legitimate frame of reference (physiology, objectiv-
ism, monism, etc.) he could push the notion of the unconscious into Soviet 
academic discourse and provide it with a certain degree of legitimacy.
Considering all of this, the enigmatic gesture of Bassin and the effect 
his book produced can be clarified this way: after the ban on Freudism, at 
the beginning of the 1930’s, the concept of the unconscious lapsed into dis-
use. For decades, the only possible perspective the term could be mentioned 
in was a negative one. This constraint, combined with the difficulty (or indif-
ference) during the 40’s and 50’s to keep up-to-date on further philosophi-
cal or psychoanalytic developments of Freud’s theory and the notion of the 
unconscious, annulled all the motivation for regarding the unconscious as a 
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valuable concept. In this atrophied and uncultivated quasi-conceptual field, 
all the conditions were ripe for the concept to lose its exo-consistency and be 
transformed into a mere sign, or to be more precise, into a negatively marked 
sign. Here is a case, when the signifier detaches from its signified and mutates 
into a sign, which does not signify except its own negative value. However, the 
concept dissolves not only due to the hollow arisen in its interior, liquidating 
its endo-consistency, but because of the disintegration its respective concep-
tual network was subjected to. After the concept of the unconscious was, first, 
roughly evacuated and then, in the aftermath of the ban, gradually brought to 
dissolution, a virtually unlimited space unfolded for the manipulation of the 
quasi-concept that the psychoanalytic unconscious had been reduced to. A 
quasi-concept, being highly compromised in its identity and lacking its con-
ceptual network, can be easily associated with nearly any concept or inserted 
into nearly any frame of reference. This is the tactic Bassin resorted to in or-
der to convert the quasi-concept from a negative into a positive or at least 
a neutral sign, preparing it to be introduced into Soviet academic discourse, 
leaving behind the tenets of censorship and being gradually refurnished with 
its conceptuality. The fact that a symposium dedicated to the questions on the 
unconscious was actually authorized a decade after the publication of Bassin’s 
book, attests to the fact that he succeeded in this enterprise. 
Obviously, this kind of conceptual shamanism was not solely Bassin’s 
privilege, although he may well be the one who presents the most compel-
ling example of it. Soviet commentators often resorted to an excessively ex-
tended usage of concepts, which albeit detrimental to the consistence of the 
concepts itself, helped in constructing unusual conceptual genealogies, which, 
in their turn, could normalize some out of line theoretical elements. In terms 
of the ‘unconscious’ we could mention, for exemple, a Georgian philosopher, 
Prof. Guram Tevzadze, who asserts, that the Kantian passive synthesis is a 
prefiguration or a previous theoretical occurrence of the unconscious, later 
elaborated by Freud, thus banalizing the psychoanalytical concept of the un-
conscious while trying to impart the capital of the classical Kant to the yet 
highly compromised concept of the unconscious.
Freud’s criticism had a political aspect as well. As I have pointed out, 
the main aim consisted in defeating psychoanalysis all over the world and was 
illustrated by the slogan “catch up and surpass.” However, even if through the 
suspicious endeavors of Bassin an inappropriately presented problem of the 
unconscious could at least be reposed and re-launched, how was it to surpass 
the existing work in psychoanalysis? In this context, the only viable strategy 
was to surpass it with an alternative theoretical approach. Qua the instru-
ment in the rivalry against the bourgeois psychoanalysis, the set theory of the 
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Georgian psychologist Dimitri Uznadze proved to be perfectly fitting. Cor-
relating the Uznadzian set with the Freudian unconscious and representing 
it as the Soviet alternative to the latter, guaranteed that, on the one hand, a 
minimal common ground could be found between the two approaches while 
they were instituted as each other’s alternatives, and, maintained, on the other 
hand, the possibility of their radical difference.
The main reason Uznadze’s figure could became of paramount impor-
tance is, that his psychological theory rendered compatible a certain notion 
of the unconscious with a non-divisional version of the subject. Contrary to 
psychoanalysis, in which the conscious and the unconscious are presented as 
two radically separated topological points, Uznadze proposed a set theory in 
which the set is an unconscious function of the psychic (Uznadze, 2006). In 
opposition to the Freudian unconscious, which can be extracted and partially 
rendered conscious, Uznadze’s scheme does not allows this sort of passage 
for reasons analogous to those which make it impossible in Kantian episte-
mology, to experience the conditions of possibility of experience. The “set” is 
not an instance, which, as a partition, would cause the psyche to internally 
divide. The set embraces the psyche in its totality, determining it through 
and through, and expresses itself through the instances of its entire modi-
fication. This non-divisional unconscious was well conformed to the postu-
late of ontological monism and, as Soviets pretended, could be presented as 
a genuine alternative to the psychoanalytical view of the subject. Uznadze’s 
psychology, finely adapted to ontological monism, was meant to secure the 
unity of the subject.
However even more interesting is the concrete way in which the differ-
ences between the Freudian and the Uznadzian versions of unconscious start-
ed to be articulated in the late 60’s. Intense elaborations specifically aimed 
at articulating this question were indeed not long in coming. The first and 
the most noteworthy effort in this direction was made by the Georgian phi-
losopher and later one of the organizers of the psychoanalytical symposium 
in Tbilisi, Apollon Sherozia, who, in 1969 and 1973, published two volumes 
with the title A contribution to the problem of the conscious and the unconscious 
(Sherozia, 1969, 1973). In opposing psychoanalysis and the set theory to each 
other, Sherozia situates them in a larger double scheme of what he calls re-
spectively the Soviet and the bourgeois systems of sciences. But before defin-
ing the role of the set theory in the system, interestingly enough, he decides 
first to oppose these two systems by means of presenting Pavlov as the objec-
tivist opposite to the subjectivist (and introspective) Freud. Soon, his choice 
to proceed in this way becomes understandable. In fact, after having set this 
oppositional configuration, Sherozia gets Pavlov to say (through a citation), 
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that the objective method is well applicable both to animals and humans, al-
though in case of humans it proves to be insufficient and the need for intro-
ducing the aspect of self-observation imposes itself. In this way, Sherozia uses 
the unquestionable authority of Pavlov to personally legitimize the introduc-
tion of a subjectivist element into the system of Soviet sciences. Therefore, 
the position of Uznadze’s theory in the system can be defined as a subjectiv-
ist complement to the Pavlovian objectivist psychology. 
The monistic character of the set theory is seen in the fact that its meth-
od mobilizes both the objectivist and the subjectivist components. In fact, 
the subjectivist part of the method, i.e. the self-observation is understood as 
a “secondary signaling system” which is nothing else than an internally ob-
jectifying system. Therefore, according to Uznadze’s claims, the set (the un-
conscious component of the psyche), that is to say, the psychological predis-
position towards a perception or an action, can be experimentally observed 
by means of transversal grasping of the objective characteristics of a given 
phenomenon or a situation and its subjective “meaning”. Strangely enough, 
in order to guarantee monism, the set theory introduces the internally objec-
tifying subjective procedure, which cannot but imply a divisional linguistic 
system, in which what is comprehended stands in an external, i.e. unnecessary 
relation to the means that objectified it. By contrast, for the sake of monism, 
Voloshinov rejected the model of discernibility between these two moments, 
because he could not support the idea of neutrality of means of expression. 
Voloshinov would likely estimate the set theory to be a prisoner of the ideal-
istic division between objectivity and subjectivity. In fact, Soviet psychology, 
contrary to its presumed Marxist character, tended rather towards an ideo-
logically sterilized, uncritical and ahistorical form.
In presenting the Soviet reception of Freudism in two stages, separated 
by the Stalinist caesura, we can see that the first period was characterized by 
free and creative Marxist appropriations no matter if it was part of the Freu-
do-Marxist or anti Freudist tendencies. The second stage is completely differ-
ent from the developments of the 20’s, and it seems that ad interim they were 
forgotten or deliberately effaced. A close study and insight into psychoana-
lytic literature do not appear any more as prerequisites for assuming a critical 
standpoint. The approach was automatically defined by the obligatory postu-
lates extrinsic to the object of scrutiny. As to the concepts, they function as 
signs, which appeal to the ‘correct’– that is to say, to the expected or previ-
ously known – responses. Freud and psychoanalysis are immediately drawn 
into the primitive logic of political rivalry with the capitalist world. This, in 
turn, finds expression in two further aspects distinctive for this period. On the 
one hand, it is obvious, that the interest in the question of the unconscious 
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is hinged on the possibility of balancing “bourgeois” psychoanalysis with its 
socialist counterweight, the latter being presumably a wholly original theory, 
having no common theoretical premises with psychoanalysis. On the other 
hand, we can clearly observe the degradation that the objectivist, monist, and 
dialectical methodological imperatives underwent. To be more specific, the 
imperatives stayed immutable, but their grip on the actual intellectual work 
loosened, bringing about relatively less controlled spaces for conceptual cre-
ativity, but at the same time making them more vulnerable to political con-
jecture. Instead of serving as stimuli for a historic and social contextualiza-
tion, these imperatives were applied only in terms of a strange physiological, 
psychic or psychosomatic synthesis, perfectly echoing with the tendency of 
suppressing all germs of political thinking and not being essentially distinct 
from the subjectivist and ahistorical psychology Voloshinov was so eager to 
denounce.
Post-Soviet depictions of the Soviet period as an intellectually dry 
stage, especially when it comes to human sciences, has its own ideological 
reasons. But, there is a need to do justice to the Soviet intellectual heritage. 
In this article, while trying to treat the question of conceptual aberrations in 
the context of intellectual atrophy, I have attempted to make an exemplary 
case of one of the possible ways of doing this. Attention needs to be focused 
on the way in which concepts are driven by forces of certain normativities and 
are pulled out of their native conceptual web, responsible for securing their 
internal consistency. The described mechanism can be helpful in shaping a 
better understanding of Soviet censorship, as well as the means of interpret-
ing Soviet commentators, since it enables us to grasp the moments in which 
authors try to maneuver between a concept and its corresponding quasi-con-
cept or between contradictory epistemo-institutional imperatives
Notes: 
1 Although Louis Althusser could not visit Tbilisi due to his acute mental 
health condition (at least this is the explanation he gave to his Georgian 
friend, philosopher Merab Mamardashvili, in their private correspon-
dence), a slightly censored Russian version of his paper about Marx and 
Freud is included into the symposiums materials and is to be found in 
the French edition of his writings as well. As for the case of Sartre’s in-
18
Elene Ladaria
tended participation, we are basing here on the oral report of Prof. Gu-
ram Tevzadze, who was involved in the organization of the symposium. 
Sartre passed away before the date of the symposium. 
2 The symposium received thousands of mentions in Western reviews. 
Four, bulky, multilingual volumes containing the symposium materials 
were printed in a huge number of copies, and became a precious item in 
Soviet bookshops.
3 The source of this testimony is a private interview with the author of this 
article (the name of the interviewee is undisclosed).
4 A separate article could take on the task of tracing the ways that psycho-
analytic theoretical tools were twisted, contorted and rendered suitable 
for pedology, helping to lay down the basics of its methods, which bore 
quite concrete normative intentions in terms of sorting into segments 
and educating the young population of the country in the context of so-
cial transformations.
5 It should be noted en passant, that Voloshinov was a close collaborator 
with M. M. Bakhtin and the complete or partial authorship of this text 
was often attributed to the latter author. However, definitive proof of this 
is missing.
6 Of course, Voloshinov does not use this term, which will be coined a de-
cade later by C. Hodson.
7 There is a consensus among historians, that the interdiction of psycho-
analysis was decreed, but there are contradictory versions as to the exact 
circumstances and the date. Some think it is 1930 (Brenner, 1999), oth-
ers suggest 1934 (Etkind and Espérionner, 1992).
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